Post by yalu on Jan 21, 2012 16:59:55 GMT -5
Interesting article on the Army rifle squad organization from WW2 into Korea.
CHAPTER 2
THE KOREAN WAR ERA
At the end of World War II, the US Army began attempting to gain the capability
to conduct squad-level fire and maneuver. The modern infantry rifle squad traces its
roots to the end of World War II; thus, the analysis begins here. By the end of the war,
the US had experienced three years of sustained ground combat, in two major theaters of
war, against two very different enemies, and in nearly every type of environment, in
terms of climate and terrain. In short, the US Army had learned about combat the hard
way, through war. World War II convinced several forward thinking American military
leaders that squad-level fire and maneuver was an essential element to future ground
tactics.
At the end of the war, US Army leaders met at their specific branch schools to
discuss the conduct of combat operations and to learn the lessons of their many successes
and failures. The Infantry Conference occurred at Fort Benning, Georgia, and published
its report in June 1946. Conference attendees formed into two committees, with each
consisting of thirty to forty officers. These officers were primarily infantry field grade
officers (major to colonel), with some representation from the armor corps, field artillery,
air corps, and even an officer of the US Navy. Brigadier General Harlan N. Hartness
chaired Committee A, while Major General James M. Gavin chaired Committee B. The
committees analyzed separate issues. Committee A focused primarily on equipment
issues, while Committee B analyzed organizational and doctrinal issues. The committee
members were all combat veterans who had served with distinction at various levels of
command, ranging from the squad and platoon level on up through the division level. In
22
evaluating the issues of importance to the infantry branch, the committees capitalized on
the vast combat experience of the members, along with observations from outside
sources, in an effort to determine the optimum force structure, doctrine, and tactics. The
reports from the 1946 Infantry Conference recommended numerous changes to the
infantry commandant.
As one of fourteen issues analyzed, Committee B asked “Is the organization of the
infantry rifle squad satisfactory? If not, what changes are desired?”1 Much as today, this
question appears to have been a topic of hot debate. The question of squad organization
yielded a “minority report,” a written opinion of dissenting members. This is important,
as this is the only issue which yielded such a report. Also, the votes on these issues were
very close, with the committee coming to a 60 percent--40 percent split on both
questions.2 Committee B initially recommended that the infantry change its rifle squad
organization. The recommended squad organization consisted of nine men, organized
with a squad leader, two scouts, an automatic rifleman (armed with a BAR) and an
assistant gunner, and four “ordinary” riflemen (one with a rifle grenade attachment on his
M-1 rifle and one serving as an ammunition bearer for the BAR).3 This differed
significantly from the twelve-man rifle squad of World War II. The World War II rifle
squad consisted of three teams: Able Team, a scout element with two scouts; Baker
Team, a fire element with an automatic rifleman, assistant gunner, and ammunition
bearer; and finally Charlie Team, the maneuver element, consisting of five riflemen. 4
The squad leader and assistant squad leader rounded out the twelve-man infantry rifle
squad of World War II (see figure 1).
23
Squad
Leader
Rifle
Figure 1. World War II Infantry Rifle Squad
Assistant
Squad
Leader
Rifle
Scout
Rifle
Scout
Rifle
Automatic
Rifleman
BAR
Assistant
Gunner
Rifle
Ammunition
Bearer
Rifle
Rifleman
Rifle
Rifleman
Rifle
Rifleman
Rifle
Rifleman
Rifle
Rifleman
Rifle
Scout
Element
Fire
Element
Maneuver
Element
The twelve-man infantry rifle squad of World War II had several weaknesses
exposed during combat operations. First, it was determined that control of eleven men,
even with an assistant squad leader, was beyond the capabilities of most squad leaders.
Also, the squad leader was frequently pinned down by enemy fire, while moving forward
with the two-man scout element, and unable to control the movement of the remainder of
the squad. Thus, the members of Committee B saw fit to recommend changes to the
organization.
Committee B supported its recommended organization based on two fundamental
issues. First, the committee members interpreted the “current” doctrinal definition of a
squad, taken from TM 22-205, The Dictionary of United States Army Terms, as limiting
the organization to only as many men as could be controlled by one leader (as shown in
Chapter One). This issue of control effectively limits the size of the squad, since
Committee B determined that “one man, under favorable conditions, can control no more
24
than eight men in the field.”5 Given the single leader, Committee B initially envisioned
the infantry rifle squad being able to perform only one mission at a time: either
establishing a base of fire or maneuvering, since to do both simultaneously would require
subordinate leaders.6
Committee B stated as a fact bearing on the study “that squads in World War II
seldom employed a base of fire and maneuver to advance.”7 Even with the twelve-man
squad formally organized into teams, the squad was seldom seen to employ fire and
maneuver. In the estimation of the committee members, this capability (or lack thereof)
did not limit the flexibility of the infantry rifle squad, since it was a capability that few
believed could exist. In testimonials, written by three junior committee members, each
having a great deal of platoon and company-level experience in the European theater of
operations (ETO), the issue of squad leader capabilities surfaced as a justification why
the squad should perform one task or the other. All three officers, a major and two
captains, stated that the majority of the World War II squad leaders (especially as
replacements began filling these positions) lacked the training and tactical capability to
execute fire and maneuver at the squad level. The recommended rifle squad still
maintained the capability to conduct fire and movement, or marching/assault fire only.
Thus, the capability of fire and maneuver continued to elude the infantry rifle squad.
The “minority report” attached to Committee B’s findings agreed that the squad
organization should be changed, but disagreed with the majority as to the optimum
organization. The dissenting opinion focused on formalizing the issue of fire and
maneuver below platoon level. Unlike the recommended nine-man infantry rifle squad
envisioned by the majority of the committee, the minority recommended a seven-man
25
rifle squad. This recommended seven-man squad would consist of a squad leader, an
assistant squad leader, and five riflemen (no mention of automatic riflemen). This squad
would be capable of only establishing a base of fire or assaulting using fire and
movement, but a section headquarters would control two squads, giving the capability of
fire and maneuver.8 The concept of a section headquarters was actually a step back in
time to a similar organization that existed in the World War I era US infantry platoon. 9
Committee members that advocated the minority position envisioned a platoon having
three sections consisting of two seven-man squads per section. This minority
recommendation would actually increase platoon size by twelve men, but gave a
significant increase in capability, with the section having a significantly greater force
with which to conduct fire and maneuver.
By a very narrow margin (fifteen to twelve), Committee B recommended the
nine-man rifle squad organization. This organization was subsequently amended to
consist of a squad leader, an assistant squad leader, an automatic rifleman, and six
“ordinary” riflemen (one of whom would serve as the assistant gunner for the BAR,
while another served as the squad grenadier). The addition of the assistant squad leader
gave the squad the limited capability to form ad hoc teams and conduct fire and
maneuver, with the assistant squad leader controlling a base of fire element, while the
squad leader maneuvered the remainder of the squad. This nine-man infantry rifle squad
was the organization that the US Army took to battle in Korea (see figure 2).
26
Rifle Squad Doctrine Prior to the Korean War
The members of Committee B envisioned the recommended nine-man infantry
rifle squad conducting operations as part of a larger force. This squad would serve as a
base of fire to overwatch the maneuver of another squad within the platoon, or the squad
would maneuver while overwatched by another squad within the platoon. While the
squad maneuvered, the squad leader would order his subordinates to conduct “fire and
movement,” to increase the volume of fire directed at the enemy force upon which the
squad advanced.
As early as 1949, US Army doctrine began to shift, requiring a limited fire and
maneuver capability from the infantry rifle squad, even before the formal incorporation
of the fire team organization. The assistant squad leader was seen to provide a limited
capability for the squad to conduct fire and maneuver; thus, the squad could maneuver in
cooperation with another squad or conduct limited internal fire and maneuver.
All nine men could be used as a single element for maneuver or frontal attack, or
the squad could be split into fire and maneuver elements. In the latter case, four
men could compose a covering party (assistant squad leader, automatic rifleman,
assistant automatic rifleman, and one rifleman) and the five other men an assault
party (the squad leader and the other four riflemen).10
Rifleman
Rifle
Assistant
Gunner
Rifle
Automatic
Rifleman
BAR
Assistant
Squad
Leader
Rifle
Rifleman
Rifle
Rifleman
Rifle
Rifleman
Rifle
Rifleman
Rifle
Squad
Leader
Rifle
Figure 2. Infantry Conference Recommended Nine-Man Infantry Rifle Squad
27
Thus, prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, one sees the roots of the fire and
maneuver capability at rifle squad level coming into US Army doctrine.
The United States entered the Korean War with the nine-man infantry rifle squad,
recommended by Committee B during the 1946 Infantry Conference. The squad was
seen primarily as having a single function; either establishing a base of fire or
maneuvering, although a limited capability was evolving for fire and maneuver at the
squad level. Typically, when the squad was moving, it conducted fire and movement to
maintain a steady volume of fire against the enemy. As the war progressed, the desire on
the part of senior army leaders to formalize the capability of squad-level fire and
maneuver shaped the future rifle squad organization.
Squad Organizational Changes in the Korean War
The performance of the US Army during the Korean War goes far beyond the
scope of this study. As the US Army conducted the Korean War, various changes in
squad size and composition occurred in an effort to increase the combat effectiveness of
the rifle squad and to enhance the squad’s ability to conduct limited fire and maneuver.
The two primary changes which came out of the Korean War were the addition of a
second BAR to the rifle squad, which paved the way for the second fundamental change,
the informal division of the squad into fire teams.
The addition of the second BAR to the squad increased the lethality of the rifle
squad in several ways. First, the sheer volume of fire delivered by the BAR surpassed
that of the rifle that it replaced. The BAR was capable of firing at a cyclic rate between
350 and 500 rounds per minute, providing the squad with an enhanced ability to suppress
an enemy force. Not only was the volume of fire increased by the automatic fire
28
capability of the BAR, but its psychological effect also enhanced the effectiveness of the
squad.
A strong advocate of the additional BAR was Brigadier General S. L. A.
Marshall, a forward-thinking military historian. Although many of Marshall’s findings
regarding combat behavior have come into question in recent years, one must understand
that during the 1950s and early 1960s his recommendations carried great weight with the
senior army leadership. Marshall argued, presumably based on his alleged analysis of
post-combat interviews during World War II, that the majority of infantry soldiers rarely
fired their individual weapons. According to Marshall, “The best showing that could be
made by the most spirited and aggressive companies was that one man in four had made
at least some use of his fire power.”11 Marshall also noted, “Usually the men with
heavier weapons, such as the BAR, flamethrower or bazooka, gave a pretty good account
of themselves, which of course is just another way of saying that the majority of the men
who were present and armed but would not fight were riflemen.”12
Thus, the addition of a second BAR not only provided a weapon with the
capability of a greater volume of fire, but also a weapon more likely to be fired than the
standard M1 rifle. Marshall had a great affinity for the BAR, believing it to be one of the
best weapons of the Korean War. “In Korean infantry operations, it is conspicuous that
rifle firing builds up strongly around the BAR. It is therefore reasonable to believe an
increase in the ratio of BARs to rifles would stimulate stronger M1 fire within the
squad.”13 Therefore the addition of a second BAR greatly increased the lethality of the
infantry rifle squad between 1952 and 1953. This organizational change also set the
stage for further change.
29
The addition of the second BAR paved the way for a more fundamental and farreaching
change: the informal division of the infantry rifle squad into fire teams, as it
provided a BAR to each team, thus allowing them to bound forward while maneuvering.
The team concept gave the infantry rifle squad the ability to conduct fire and maneuver,
as opposed to this significant capability beginning at the platoon level. This concept
could be maximized only when each team had the capability to provide a base of fire or
maneuver. By having two BARs within the squad, the informal teams were now capable
of performing either role, establishing a base of fire or maneuvering. No longer would
teams need to be specialized, as a “fire” team or a “maneuver” team, based upon the
placement of the single BAR.
Marshall was also a strong advocate of the fire team within the squad. Although
the nine-man squad without fire teams appeared to be performing well in combat in
Korea, Marshall believed that a change was necessary. He felt that this fire team
composition would benefit the squad in many ways.
Marshall believed the addition of fire team leaders would increase the battlefield
participation of the fire team members, as another leader would exist to exhort men to fire
their weapons. Marshall recommended a nine-man squad organization consisting of a
squad leader and two fire teams. Each fire team would consist of a team leader, an
automatic rifleman (armed with a BAR), and two additional riflemen, one of whom
would serve as a hand grenadier. Marshall obviously envisioned the balanced fire teams
allowing fire and maneuver in the sense that it is understood in current doctrine, with
teams able to switch roles easily and bound forward.
30
Additionally, Marshall viewed the addition of the fire team leader position as a
training ground for developing future squad leaders from a pool of inexperienced
soldiers. Finally, Marshall believed that the fire teams would provide a self-contained
small unit for a more organized execution of typical duties, such as outposts. Thus,
Marshall envisioned additional benefits resulting from the formalization of fire team
organizations within the rifle squad, above simply providing for squad-level fire and
maneuver.
While changing the composition of the squad, Marshall also sought to fix less
apparent problems. The designation of a soldier in each team as a hand grenadier was
designed to alleviate a discrepancy noted during defensive operations in Korea. It
appears that in the defense, all riflemen within the squad employed hand grenades and
were unable to quickly shift to using their rifles. Marshall believed that if two of the four
riflemen per squad were designated hand grenadiers, this would alleviate the difficulties
noted in transitioning to the rifle.14 Thus, Marshall, with his significant influence over
the upper echelons of the US Army leadership, became an early and strong proponent for
the infantry rifle squad composed of fire teams.
As one examines the issue of fire and maneuver and the development of the fire
team within the squad, it becomes clear that, although this was a relatively new concept
at squad level, it had been a basic function for units above the squad. According to
military analyst John English, in On Infantry, the concept of the fire team had its
beginnings in World War II, in an attempt to give the rifle squad the capability to conduct
fire and maneuver similar to the capability provided by the sections of World War I.
These sections controlled squads; thus they had the capability of fire and maneuver.
31
English states that “some like Colonel J. C. Fry’s 350th Infantry of the Seventy-seventh
Division in Italy, employed an assault battle drill for squads (divided simply into fire
teams and maneuver teams) and platoons; the fire and maneuver stressed, however had a
definitely frontal bias up to and including platoon level.”15 Since initially Colonel Fry
created ad hoc task organizations, his units were able to conduct a limited battle drill,
with one team (the “fire team” primarily consisting of BARs) providing a base of fire to
facilitate the maneuver of the second team (the “maneuver team”). This ad hoc
organization allowed only very limited capability for these teams to reverse roles and
bound forward by teams.
In 1955, then Major General J. C. Fry published Assault Battle Drill, capturing
the basic concepts of his squad and platoon-level fire and maneuver drill. Assault Battle
Drill still limited the effectiveness of squad-level fire and maneuver by designating a
“fire team” and a “maneuver team,” allowing these teams only limited capability to
perform the alternate task. Fry did not envision the “fire team” remaining in one location
throughout the assault, but instead envisioned it advancing on the enemy position while
continuing to provide a base of fire for the “maneuver team.”16 On the other hand, the
“maneuver team” was seen to advance on the enemy using a covered and concealed
route, alternate individual rushes, or even crawling to close with the enemy force and
conduct the assault, all the while overwatched by the “fire team.”17 Although compared
to the current capabilities of a rifle squad organized with balanced fire teams, this
organization appears unwieldy and inflexible, Assault Battle Drill provided a significant
capability at the close of the Korean War. As the organization shifted toward the
designation of fire teams within the rifle squad, it is important to note that by the end of
32
the Korean War, the US Army nine-man infantry rifle squad was still formally organized
to fight as a single entity, with only a limited capability for fire and maneuver.
Preliminary Studies of the Mid-1950s
Following the end of the Korean War, several lesser-known studies were
conducted to analyze concepts coming out of the recent war. Operation Falcon and
Exercises Follow Me and Sagebrush occurred from 1953 through 1955, analyzing
different squad organizations, attempting to discern the most combat effective
organization.
Operation Falcon, in 1953, and Exercise Follow Me, from 1954 through 1955,
both tested squads composed without fire teams. Operation Falcon, conducted by 18th
Airborne Corps, analyzed an eleven-man squad composed of a squad leader, an assistant
squad leader, two automatic riflemen, two assistant automatic riflemen, and five
“ordinary” riflemen. The results from Operation FALCON indicated that the eleven-man
squad was satisfactory, based on the squad leader’s ability to control the squad and the
additional BAR, while still maneuvering the squad. The Infantry School at Fort Benning
questioned these results, continuing to hold to the 1946 Infantry Conference definition of
the infantry rifle squad as being led by only one man. 18
Exercise Follow Me went to the opposite end of the spectrum, evaluating a sevenman
infantry rifle squad. This test seemed to flow out of the Infantry School’s
disagreement with the findings of Operation Falcon. The infantry rifle squad analyzed
during Exercise Follow Me was composed of a squad leader, an automatic rifleman, an
assistant automatic rifleman, and four “ordinary” riflemen. Notably absent was the
assistant squad leader, under the belief that such a small squad would not require an
33
additional leader. This composition all but assured that the squad would be capable of
only a single action, either fire or maneuver. This seven-man squad was compared to the
current nine-man squad, composed without fire teams. The results favored the current
nine-man squad based on its additional firepower provided by the addition of the second
BAR during the Korean War. Also, a reduction in control was noted as a result of the
omission of the assistant squad leader.19 None of the recommendations of Operation
Falcon or Exercise Follow Me were instituted within the rifle squad of the 1950s. These
studies did, however, set the stage for the next major analysis of America’s war-fighting
capability.
Exercise Sagebrush was a joint exercise between the US Army and the US Air
Force, which focused on how to fight the next war, envisioned as a conflict in Western
Europe against the Soviet Union and the newly formed Warsaw Pact. This test
envisioned a “dirty” battlefield due to the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons. Although the test focused on many larger concepts, evaluators also reviewed
the infantry rifle squad organization. The 3d Infantry Division provided the majority of
the forces for this test and analyzed the size and composition of the rifle squad, to ensure
that the current organization was relevant for the anticipated battlefield of the future. The
exercise reports stated “the 3d Infantry Division report from this exercise concluded that
the nine-man squad was too large for one man to control and too small to be broken into
subdivisions.”20 The 3d Infantry Division report instead recommended a triangular
organization, similar to the US Marine Corps’ squad, while being slightly reminiscent of
the World War II era US Army rifle squad.21 The Exercise Sagebrush-recommended rifle
squad consisted of twelve men, organized with a squad leader, an assistant squad leader,
34
a four-man fire team (consisting of two automatic riflemen and two riflemen), and two
maneuver teams (consisting of three riflemen each). The report explained that the
assistant squad leader would direct the fire team as it established a base of fire, while the
squad leader would control the maneuver teams, directing the assault.22 As with the
recommendations of Operation Falcon and Exercise Follow Me, these recommendations
had virtually no impact on the US Army. 23
Although the recommendations of Operation Falcon and Exercises Follow Me
and Sagebrush were not acted upon, they illustrate the growing desire for change in the
organization of the infantry rifle squad. By the mid-1950s, across the Army the basic
infantry squad organization recommended by the 1946 Infantry Conference was being
viewed as no longer adequate. The concept of fire and maneuver seems to have captured
the imagination of senior infantry leaders, causing them to attempt to develop an
organization that allowed them to fully realize this capability. This attempt to gain a
capability led to the study that forever changed the composition of the infantry rifle
squad.
A Research Study of Infantry Rifle Squad TOE (1956)
In 1956, Headquarters, Continental Army Command (CONARC), ordered a study
to determine the optimum organization of the infantry rifle squad. The US Army’s recent
experiences in the Korean War actually showed considerable success for the infantry rifle
squad. Although the history of the Korean War is filled with examples of poor training
and preparedness, the basic combat effectiveness of the infantry rifle squad organization
received high marks. Several factors appear to have prompted the CONARC commander
to order the evaluation of the basic squad organization.
35
First, the evolving concept of fire and maneuver coming out of the Korean War
seems to have led many to believe that the time had come to formalize the organizational
breakdown of the rifle squad to fully facilitate this capability. US Army Generals J. C.
Fry and S. L. A. Marshall continued to lobby for the formal organization of fire teams
within the rifle squad. Fry saw the formal organization as enhancing the capability of the
rifle squad to execute fire and maneuver through the formation of balanced teams, each
equally capable of establishing a base of fire or maneuvering. Marshall seemed to be still
trying to solve the issue of limited volume of fire from infantry organizations. According
to the Infantry School at Fort Benning, individual firing among infantrymen had already
risen during the war, with actions in Korea resulting in 25 to 35 percent of most units
taking an active, firing role in the battle.24 Nonetheless, Marshall still continued to
believe that the additional leadership inherent in a rifle squad composed of fire teams was
necessary and would significantly increase the squad’s volume of fire.
Secondly, many within the Army appear to have been fascinated with the US
Marine Corps’ thirteen-man infantry rifle squad, organized with three fire teams, each
consisting of four men (team leader, automatic rifleman, assistant automatic rifleman, and
grenadier).25 Many believed that a similar organization would provide US Army rifle
squads with significant increases in their capability to conduct fire and maneuver. Thus,
CONARC’s Combat Developments Section ordered the Combat Operations Research
Group (CORG) to study rifle squad TOEs in an effort to recommend the optimum
organization for combat effectiveness.
Out of the CORG study came A Research Study of Infantry Rifle Squad TOE
(1956), commonly referred to as ASIRS. This study focused on three primary areas:
36
ENHANCING COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, THE
EVOLUTION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
INFANTRY RIFLE SQUAD SINCE THE
END OF WORLD WAR II
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the US Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Military History
by
TIMOTHY M. KARCHER, MAJ, USA
B.S. University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, 1989
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2002
EVOLUTION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
INFANTRY RIFLE SQUAD SINCE THE
END OF WORLD WAR II
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the US Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Military History
by
TIMOTHY M. KARCHER, MAJ, USA
B.S. University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, 1989
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2002
CHAPTER 2
THE KOREAN WAR ERA
At the end of World War II, the US Army began attempting to gain the capability
to conduct squad-level fire and maneuver. The modern infantry rifle squad traces its
roots to the end of World War II; thus, the analysis begins here. By the end of the war,
the US had experienced three years of sustained ground combat, in two major theaters of
war, against two very different enemies, and in nearly every type of environment, in
terms of climate and terrain. In short, the US Army had learned about combat the hard
way, through war. World War II convinced several forward thinking American military
leaders that squad-level fire and maneuver was an essential element to future ground
tactics.
At the end of the war, US Army leaders met at their specific branch schools to
discuss the conduct of combat operations and to learn the lessons of their many successes
and failures. The Infantry Conference occurred at Fort Benning, Georgia, and published
its report in June 1946. Conference attendees formed into two committees, with each
consisting of thirty to forty officers. These officers were primarily infantry field grade
officers (major to colonel), with some representation from the armor corps, field artillery,
air corps, and even an officer of the US Navy. Brigadier General Harlan N. Hartness
chaired Committee A, while Major General James M. Gavin chaired Committee B. The
committees analyzed separate issues. Committee A focused primarily on equipment
issues, while Committee B analyzed organizational and doctrinal issues. The committee
members were all combat veterans who had served with distinction at various levels of
command, ranging from the squad and platoon level on up through the division level. In
22
evaluating the issues of importance to the infantry branch, the committees capitalized on
the vast combat experience of the members, along with observations from outside
sources, in an effort to determine the optimum force structure, doctrine, and tactics. The
reports from the 1946 Infantry Conference recommended numerous changes to the
infantry commandant.
As one of fourteen issues analyzed, Committee B asked “Is the organization of the
infantry rifle squad satisfactory? If not, what changes are desired?”1 Much as today, this
question appears to have been a topic of hot debate. The question of squad organization
yielded a “minority report,” a written opinion of dissenting members. This is important,
as this is the only issue which yielded such a report. Also, the votes on these issues were
very close, with the committee coming to a 60 percent--40 percent split on both
questions.2 Committee B initially recommended that the infantry change its rifle squad
organization. The recommended squad organization consisted of nine men, organized
with a squad leader, two scouts, an automatic rifleman (armed with a BAR) and an
assistant gunner, and four “ordinary” riflemen (one with a rifle grenade attachment on his
M-1 rifle and one serving as an ammunition bearer for the BAR).3 This differed
significantly from the twelve-man rifle squad of World War II. The World War II rifle
squad consisted of three teams: Able Team, a scout element with two scouts; Baker
Team, a fire element with an automatic rifleman, assistant gunner, and ammunition
bearer; and finally Charlie Team, the maneuver element, consisting of five riflemen. 4
The squad leader and assistant squad leader rounded out the twelve-man infantry rifle
squad of World War II (see figure 1).
23
Squad
Leader
Rifle
Figure 1. World War II Infantry Rifle Squad
Assistant
Squad
Leader
Rifle
Scout
Rifle
Scout
Rifle
Automatic
Rifleman
BAR
Assistant
Gunner
Rifle
Ammunition
Bearer
Rifle
Rifleman
Rifle
Rifleman
Rifle
Rifleman
Rifle
Rifleman
Rifle
Rifleman
Rifle
Scout
Element
Fire
Element
Maneuver
Element
The twelve-man infantry rifle squad of World War II had several weaknesses
exposed during combat operations. First, it was determined that control of eleven men,
even with an assistant squad leader, was beyond the capabilities of most squad leaders.
Also, the squad leader was frequently pinned down by enemy fire, while moving forward
with the two-man scout element, and unable to control the movement of the remainder of
the squad. Thus, the members of Committee B saw fit to recommend changes to the
organization.
Committee B supported its recommended organization based on two fundamental
issues. First, the committee members interpreted the “current” doctrinal definition of a
squad, taken from TM 22-205, The Dictionary of United States Army Terms, as limiting
the organization to only as many men as could be controlled by one leader (as shown in
Chapter One). This issue of control effectively limits the size of the squad, since
Committee B determined that “one man, under favorable conditions, can control no more
24
than eight men in the field.”5 Given the single leader, Committee B initially envisioned
the infantry rifle squad being able to perform only one mission at a time: either
establishing a base of fire or maneuvering, since to do both simultaneously would require
subordinate leaders.6
Committee B stated as a fact bearing on the study “that squads in World War II
seldom employed a base of fire and maneuver to advance.”7 Even with the twelve-man
squad formally organized into teams, the squad was seldom seen to employ fire and
maneuver. In the estimation of the committee members, this capability (or lack thereof)
did not limit the flexibility of the infantry rifle squad, since it was a capability that few
believed could exist. In testimonials, written by three junior committee members, each
having a great deal of platoon and company-level experience in the European theater of
operations (ETO), the issue of squad leader capabilities surfaced as a justification why
the squad should perform one task or the other. All three officers, a major and two
captains, stated that the majority of the World War II squad leaders (especially as
replacements began filling these positions) lacked the training and tactical capability to
execute fire and maneuver at the squad level. The recommended rifle squad still
maintained the capability to conduct fire and movement, or marching/assault fire only.
Thus, the capability of fire and maneuver continued to elude the infantry rifle squad.
The “minority report” attached to Committee B’s findings agreed that the squad
organization should be changed, but disagreed with the majority as to the optimum
organization. The dissenting opinion focused on formalizing the issue of fire and
maneuver below platoon level. Unlike the recommended nine-man infantry rifle squad
envisioned by the majority of the committee, the minority recommended a seven-man
25
rifle squad. This recommended seven-man squad would consist of a squad leader, an
assistant squad leader, and five riflemen (no mention of automatic riflemen). This squad
would be capable of only establishing a base of fire or assaulting using fire and
movement, but a section headquarters would control two squads, giving the capability of
fire and maneuver.8 The concept of a section headquarters was actually a step back in
time to a similar organization that existed in the World War I era US infantry platoon. 9
Committee members that advocated the minority position envisioned a platoon having
three sections consisting of two seven-man squads per section. This minority
recommendation would actually increase platoon size by twelve men, but gave a
significant increase in capability, with the section having a significantly greater force
with which to conduct fire and maneuver.
By a very narrow margin (fifteen to twelve), Committee B recommended the
nine-man rifle squad organization. This organization was subsequently amended to
consist of a squad leader, an assistant squad leader, an automatic rifleman, and six
“ordinary” riflemen (one of whom would serve as the assistant gunner for the BAR,
while another served as the squad grenadier). The addition of the assistant squad leader
gave the squad the limited capability to form ad hoc teams and conduct fire and
maneuver, with the assistant squad leader controlling a base of fire element, while the
squad leader maneuvered the remainder of the squad. This nine-man infantry rifle squad
was the organization that the US Army took to battle in Korea (see figure 2).
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Rifle Squad Doctrine Prior to the Korean War
The members of Committee B envisioned the recommended nine-man infantry
rifle squad conducting operations as part of a larger force. This squad would serve as a
base of fire to overwatch the maneuver of another squad within the platoon, or the squad
would maneuver while overwatched by another squad within the platoon. While the
squad maneuvered, the squad leader would order his subordinates to conduct “fire and
movement,” to increase the volume of fire directed at the enemy force upon which the
squad advanced.
As early as 1949, US Army doctrine began to shift, requiring a limited fire and
maneuver capability from the infantry rifle squad, even before the formal incorporation
of the fire team organization. The assistant squad leader was seen to provide a limited
capability for the squad to conduct fire and maneuver; thus, the squad could maneuver in
cooperation with another squad or conduct limited internal fire and maneuver.
All nine men could be used as a single element for maneuver or frontal attack, or
the squad could be split into fire and maneuver elements. In the latter case, four
men could compose a covering party (assistant squad leader, automatic rifleman,
assistant automatic rifleman, and one rifleman) and the five other men an assault
party (the squad leader and the other four riflemen).10
Rifleman
Rifle
Assistant
Gunner
Rifle
Automatic
Rifleman
BAR
Assistant
Squad
Leader
Rifle
Rifleman
Rifle
Rifleman
Rifle
Rifleman
Rifle
Rifleman
Rifle
Squad
Leader
Rifle
Figure 2. Infantry Conference Recommended Nine-Man Infantry Rifle Squad
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Thus, prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, one sees the roots of the fire and
maneuver capability at rifle squad level coming into US Army doctrine.
The United States entered the Korean War with the nine-man infantry rifle squad,
recommended by Committee B during the 1946 Infantry Conference. The squad was
seen primarily as having a single function; either establishing a base of fire or
maneuvering, although a limited capability was evolving for fire and maneuver at the
squad level. Typically, when the squad was moving, it conducted fire and movement to
maintain a steady volume of fire against the enemy. As the war progressed, the desire on
the part of senior army leaders to formalize the capability of squad-level fire and
maneuver shaped the future rifle squad organization.
Squad Organizational Changes in the Korean War
The performance of the US Army during the Korean War goes far beyond the
scope of this study. As the US Army conducted the Korean War, various changes in
squad size and composition occurred in an effort to increase the combat effectiveness of
the rifle squad and to enhance the squad’s ability to conduct limited fire and maneuver.
The two primary changes which came out of the Korean War were the addition of a
second BAR to the rifle squad, which paved the way for the second fundamental change,
the informal division of the squad into fire teams.
The addition of the second BAR to the squad increased the lethality of the rifle
squad in several ways. First, the sheer volume of fire delivered by the BAR surpassed
that of the rifle that it replaced. The BAR was capable of firing at a cyclic rate between
350 and 500 rounds per minute, providing the squad with an enhanced ability to suppress
an enemy force. Not only was the volume of fire increased by the automatic fire
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capability of the BAR, but its psychological effect also enhanced the effectiveness of the
squad.
A strong advocate of the additional BAR was Brigadier General S. L. A.
Marshall, a forward-thinking military historian. Although many of Marshall’s findings
regarding combat behavior have come into question in recent years, one must understand
that during the 1950s and early 1960s his recommendations carried great weight with the
senior army leadership. Marshall argued, presumably based on his alleged analysis of
post-combat interviews during World War II, that the majority of infantry soldiers rarely
fired their individual weapons. According to Marshall, “The best showing that could be
made by the most spirited and aggressive companies was that one man in four had made
at least some use of his fire power.”11 Marshall also noted, “Usually the men with
heavier weapons, such as the BAR, flamethrower or bazooka, gave a pretty good account
of themselves, which of course is just another way of saying that the majority of the men
who were present and armed but would not fight were riflemen.”12
Thus, the addition of a second BAR not only provided a weapon with the
capability of a greater volume of fire, but also a weapon more likely to be fired than the
standard M1 rifle. Marshall had a great affinity for the BAR, believing it to be one of the
best weapons of the Korean War. “In Korean infantry operations, it is conspicuous that
rifle firing builds up strongly around the BAR. It is therefore reasonable to believe an
increase in the ratio of BARs to rifles would stimulate stronger M1 fire within the
squad.”13 Therefore the addition of a second BAR greatly increased the lethality of the
infantry rifle squad between 1952 and 1953. This organizational change also set the
stage for further change.
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The addition of the second BAR paved the way for a more fundamental and farreaching
change: the informal division of the infantry rifle squad into fire teams, as it
provided a BAR to each team, thus allowing them to bound forward while maneuvering.
The team concept gave the infantry rifle squad the ability to conduct fire and maneuver,
as opposed to this significant capability beginning at the platoon level. This concept
could be maximized only when each team had the capability to provide a base of fire or
maneuver. By having two BARs within the squad, the informal teams were now capable
of performing either role, establishing a base of fire or maneuvering. No longer would
teams need to be specialized, as a “fire” team or a “maneuver” team, based upon the
placement of the single BAR.
Marshall was also a strong advocate of the fire team within the squad. Although
the nine-man squad without fire teams appeared to be performing well in combat in
Korea, Marshall believed that a change was necessary. He felt that this fire team
composition would benefit the squad in many ways.
Marshall believed the addition of fire team leaders would increase the battlefield
participation of the fire team members, as another leader would exist to exhort men to fire
their weapons. Marshall recommended a nine-man squad organization consisting of a
squad leader and two fire teams. Each fire team would consist of a team leader, an
automatic rifleman (armed with a BAR), and two additional riflemen, one of whom
would serve as a hand grenadier. Marshall obviously envisioned the balanced fire teams
allowing fire and maneuver in the sense that it is understood in current doctrine, with
teams able to switch roles easily and bound forward.
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Additionally, Marshall viewed the addition of the fire team leader position as a
training ground for developing future squad leaders from a pool of inexperienced
soldiers. Finally, Marshall believed that the fire teams would provide a self-contained
small unit for a more organized execution of typical duties, such as outposts. Thus,
Marshall envisioned additional benefits resulting from the formalization of fire team
organizations within the rifle squad, above simply providing for squad-level fire and
maneuver.
While changing the composition of the squad, Marshall also sought to fix less
apparent problems. The designation of a soldier in each team as a hand grenadier was
designed to alleviate a discrepancy noted during defensive operations in Korea. It
appears that in the defense, all riflemen within the squad employed hand grenades and
were unable to quickly shift to using their rifles. Marshall believed that if two of the four
riflemen per squad were designated hand grenadiers, this would alleviate the difficulties
noted in transitioning to the rifle.14 Thus, Marshall, with his significant influence over
the upper echelons of the US Army leadership, became an early and strong proponent for
the infantry rifle squad composed of fire teams.
As one examines the issue of fire and maneuver and the development of the fire
team within the squad, it becomes clear that, although this was a relatively new concept
at squad level, it had been a basic function for units above the squad. According to
military analyst John English, in On Infantry, the concept of the fire team had its
beginnings in World War II, in an attempt to give the rifle squad the capability to conduct
fire and maneuver similar to the capability provided by the sections of World War I.
These sections controlled squads; thus they had the capability of fire and maneuver.
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English states that “some like Colonel J. C. Fry’s 350th Infantry of the Seventy-seventh
Division in Italy, employed an assault battle drill for squads (divided simply into fire
teams and maneuver teams) and platoons; the fire and maneuver stressed, however had a
definitely frontal bias up to and including platoon level.”15 Since initially Colonel Fry
created ad hoc task organizations, his units were able to conduct a limited battle drill,
with one team (the “fire team” primarily consisting of BARs) providing a base of fire to
facilitate the maneuver of the second team (the “maneuver team”). This ad hoc
organization allowed only very limited capability for these teams to reverse roles and
bound forward by teams.
In 1955, then Major General J. C. Fry published Assault Battle Drill, capturing
the basic concepts of his squad and platoon-level fire and maneuver drill. Assault Battle
Drill still limited the effectiveness of squad-level fire and maneuver by designating a
“fire team” and a “maneuver team,” allowing these teams only limited capability to
perform the alternate task. Fry did not envision the “fire team” remaining in one location
throughout the assault, but instead envisioned it advancing on the enemy position while
continuing to provide a base of fire for the “maneuver team.”16 On the other hand, the
“maneuver team” was seen to advance on the enemy using a covered and concealed
route, alternate individual rushes, or even crawling to close with the enemy force and
conduct the assault, all the while overwatched by the “fire team.”17 Although compared
to the current capabilities of a rifle squad organized with balanced fire teams, this
organization appears unwieldy and inflexible, Assault Battle Drill provided a significant
capability at the close of the Korean War. As the organization shifted toward the
designation of fire teams within the rifle squad, it is important to note that by the end of
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the Korean War, the US Army nine-man infantry rifle squad was still formally organized
to fight as a single entity, with only a limited capability for fire and maneuver.
Preliminary Studies of the Mid-1950s
Following the end of the Korean War, several lesser-known studies were
conducted to analyze concepts coming out of the recent war. Operation Falcon and
Exercises Follow Me and Sagebrush occurred from 1953 through 1955, analyzing
different squad organizations, attempting to discern the most combat effective
organization.
Operation Falcon, in 1953, and Exercise Follow Me, from 1954 through 1955,
both tested squads composed without fire teams. Operation Falcon, conducted by 18th
Airborne Corps, analyzed an eleven-man squad composed of a squad leader, an assistant
squad leader, two automatic riflemen, two assistant automatic riflemen, and five
“ordinary” riflemen. The results from Operation FALCON indicated that the eleven-man
squad was satisfactory, based on the squad leader’s ability to control the squad and the
additional BAR, while still maneuvering the squad. The Infantry School at Fort Benning
questioned these results, continuing to hold to the 1946 Infantry Conference definition of
the infantry rifle squad as being led by only one man. 18
Exercise Follow Me went to the opposite end of the spectrum, evaluating a sevenman
infantry rifle squad. This test seemed to flow out of the Infantry School’s
disagreement with the findings of Operation Falcon. The infantry rifle squad analyzed
during Exercise Follow Me was composed of a squad leader, an automatic rifleman, an
assistant automatic rifleman, and four “ordinary” riflemen. Notably absent was the
assistant squad leader, under the belief that such a small squad would not require an
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additional leader. This composition all but assured that the squad would be capable of
only a single action, either fire or maneuver. This seven-man squad was compared to the
current nine-man squad, composed without fire teams. The results favored the current
nine-man squad based on its additional firepower provided by the addition of the second
BAR during the Korean War. Also, a reduction in control was noted as a result of the
omission of the assistant squad leader.19 None of the recommendations of Operation
Falcon or Exercise Follow Me were instituted within the rifle squad of the 1950s. These
studies did, however, set the stage for the next major analysis of America’s war-fighting
capability.
Exercise Sagebrush was a joint exercise between the US Army and the US Air
Force, which focused on how to fight the next war, envisioned as a conflict in Western
Europe against the Soviet Union and the newly formed Warsaw Pact. This test
envisioned a “dirty” battlefield due to the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons. Although the test focused on many larger concepts, evaluators also reviewed
the infantry rifle squad organization. The 3d Infantry Division provided the majority of
the forces for this test and analyzed the size and composition of the rifle squad, to ensure
that the current organization was relevant for the anticipated battlefield of the future. The
exercise reports stated “the 3d Infantry Division report from this exercise concluded that
the nine-man squad was too large for one man to control and too small to be broken into
subdivisions.”20 The 3d Infantry Division report instead recommended a triangular
organization, similar to the US Marine Corps’ squad, while being slightly reminiscent of
the World War II era US Army rifle squad.21 The Exercise Sagebrush-recommended rifle
squad consisted of twelve men, organized with a squad leader, an assistant squad leader,
34
a four-man fire team (consisting of two automatic riflemen and two riflemen), and two
maneuver teams (consisting of three riflemen each). The report explained that the
assistant squad leader would direct the fire team as it established a base of fire, while the
squad leader would control the maneuver teams, directing the assault.22 As with the
recommendations of Operation Falcon and Exercise Follow Me, these recommendations
had virtually no impact on the US Army. 23
Although the recommendations of Operation Falcon and Exercises Follow Me
and Sagebrush were not acted upon, they illustrate the growing desire for change in the
organization of the infantry rifle squad. By the mid-1950s, across the Army the basic
infantry squad organization recommended by the 1946 Infantry Conference was being
viewed as no longer adequate. The concept of fire and maneuver seems to have captured
the imagination of senior infantry leaders, causing them to attempt to develop an
organization that allowed them to fully realize this capability. This attempt to gain a
capability led to the study that forever changed the composition of the infantry rifle
squad.
A Research Study of Infantry Rifle Squad TOE (1956)
In 1956, Headquarters, Continental Army Command (CONARC), ordered a study
to determine the optimum organization of the infantry rifle squad. The US Army’s recent
experiences in the Korean War actually showed considerable success for the infantry rifle
squad. Although the history of the Korean War is filled with examples of poor training
and preparedness, the basic combat effectiveness of the infantry rifle squad organization
received high marks. Several factors appear to have prompted the CONARC commander
to order the evaluation of the basic squad organization.
35
First, the evolving concept of fire and maneuver coming out of the Korean War
seems to have led many to believe that the time had come to formalize the organizational
breakdown of the rifle squad to fully facilitate this capability. US Army Generals J. C.
Fry and S. L. A. Marshall continued to lobby for the formal organization of fire teams
within the rifle squad. Fry saw the formal organization as enhancing the capability of the
rifle squad to execute fire and maneuver through the formation of balanced teams, each
equally capable of establishing a base of fire or maneuvering. Marshall seemed to be still
trying to solve the issue of limited volume of fire from infantry organizations. According
to the Infantry School at Fort Benning, individual firing among infantrymen had already
risen during the war, with actions in Korea resulting in 25 to 35 percent of most units
taking an active, firing role in the battle.24 Nonetheless, Marshall still continued to
believe that the additional leadership inherent in a rifle squad composed of fire teams was
necessary and would significantly increase the squad’s volume of fire.
Secondly, many within the Army appear to have been fascinated with the US
Marine Corps’ thirteen-man infantry rifle squad, organized with three fire teams, each
consisting of four men (team leader, automatic rifleman, assistant automatic rifleman, and
grenadier).25 Many believed that a similar organization would provide US Army rifle
squads with significant increases in their capability to conduct fire and maneuver. Thus,
CONARC’s Combat Developments Section ordered the Combat Operations Research
Group (CORG) to study rifle squad TOEs in an effort to recommend the optimum
organization for combat effectiveness.
Out of the CORG study came A Research Study of Infantry Rifle Squad TOE
(1956), commonly referred to as ASIRS. This study focused on three primary areas:
36